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I. Introduction
Sympathy is the common feeling of understanding others’ suffering, of caring about others’ trouble and grief, and of supporting others in the form of shared feelings. The origin of the word sympathy, however, is 
not comprised to the compassionate perception of the calamities of others. 
Animating Sympathetic Feelings.
An Analysis of the Nature of Sympathy in 
the Accounts of David Hume’s Treatise
Abstract
Sympathy is a powerful principle in human nature, which can change our passions, 
sentiments and ways of thinking. For the 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume, 
sympathy is a working mechanism accountable for a wide range of communication: 
the ways of interacting with the others’ affections, emotions, sentiments, inclinations, 
ways of thinking and even opinions. The present paper intends to find a systematic 
reading of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739) from the point of view of what the 
mechanism of sympathetic communication implies in terms of strengthening our action of 
understanding, of being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, 
and experience of others. Hume’s description of the sympathetic mechanism appears to 
suggest that sympathetic passions come upon us purely by natural means in a passive 
manner, without the active use of any of our faculties. Consequently, scholarly attention 
is drawn to the mechanistic character of the sympathetic process; its automatic nature is 
emphasized to such an extent that some experts even find it to be completely void of any 
reflective process. The current study investigates to what extent the sympathetic process 
can actively be modified and in what manner sympathetic feelings can be generated 
as described in Hume’s system of emotions. The paper identifies at which points the 
otherwise mechanically and passively operating process of sympathetic feelings is open to 
be modified by actively altering or strengthening certain skeletal points of the mechanism. 
I argue that the alterations can be initiated by the person who receives the sympathetic 
feelings and also by the person whose passions are transmitted, moreover even by a third 
party. In a seemingly mechanic model, there is room for altering or at least amplifying 
one’s sympathetic feelings.
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It used to convey a broader concept than the feeling of pity and sorrow for 
someone else’s misfortune. The Greek word sympatheia (συμπάθεια) covers 
the general meaning of fellow-feelings, where pathos (πάθος) refers to any 
kind of emotion or passion, including pleasure and pain.1 In harmony with 
the etymological origins of the word, the 18th-century Scottish philosopher, 
David Hume (1711 – 1776), applied the technical term ‘sympathy’ in a more 
extended meaning than today’s common usage of the word. Hume discusses 
sympathy in detail in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739),2 where he expli-
cates that sympathy is a complex mechanism not to be confused with the feel-
ing of compassion. In the Treatise, Hume bases his philosophy on the observa-
tion of facts about human nature; thus Hume’s treatment of the sympathetic 
mechanism is fundamentally descriptive.3 The observation-based, descriptive 
Treatise does not provide us with straightforwardly worded advice on how to 
use the sympathetic principle in a conscious manner if it is possible at all. The 
present paper intends to find a systematic reading of Hume’s Treatise from 
the point of view of what the accounts of the mechanism of sympathetic 
communication implies in terms of strengthening our action of understand-
ing, of being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, 
and experience of others. Accordingly, the current study investigates to what 
extent the sympathetic process can actively be affected on and in what man-
ner sympathetic feelings can be generated as described in Hume’s system of 
emotions. In order to apprehend the way sympathy is treated by Hume, the 
nature of the Treatise is discussed first. It is followed by the explication why 
sympathy plays a crucial role in Hume’s description of human nature. Then 
1 Henry George Liddell, and Robert Scott, Greek-English Lexicon with a Revised Supplement 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1285 (entry: πάθος).
2 References are to the 2007 edition David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate 
Norton, and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), henceforth cited by book, part, 
section, and paragraph number; Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. 
Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) will by cited by section, paragraph, 
and page number accordingly. It is only in the Treatise where Hume gives a comprehensive 
analysis of the working mechanism of sympathy. In the Dissertation on the Passions and the 
Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals Hume remains reticent about the way we sympathize 
with others. Vitz collects several possible explanations why the explication of the mechanism 
of sympathy could have been dropped in the Enquiry. See Rico Vitz, “Sympathy and Benevo-
lence in Hume’s Moral Psychology,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 42, no. 3 (2004): 262. 
3 Some scholars interpret the descriptive tendency of Hume’s works to be a sign of the author 
avoiding the transgression of the is-ought gap [see Daniel J. Singer, “Mind the Is-Ought Gap,” 
The Journal of Philosophy 112, no. 4 (2015): 193-210], which is a customary interpretation of 
Hume’s famous warning against the dangers of failing to consider the is-ought distinction in 
moral philosophy (see Hume, Treatise, 3.1.1.27); while others suggest that there is still some 
normativity in the Humean accounts of human nature [see, for example, Tito Magri, “Natural 
Obligation and Normative Motivation in Hume’s Treatise,” Hume Studies 22, no. 2 (1996): 
231-254]. 
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the working mechanism of sympathy is clarified in the Humean framework, 
the points in each step are highlighted where the mechanism is less than com-
pletely automated. Finally, the view claiming that the sympathetic process 
is entirely automatic is rebutted by revealing the non-mechanic elements in 
several Humean examples accounting for the process.
II. The nature of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature
As the subtitle of the Treatise, Hume’s earliest philosophical work, clarifies, 
Hume ventures to “explain the principles of human nature”4 by introducing 
the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. Moral philosophy 
for Hume does not primarily mean the deliberation about what is right and 
wrong in our conduct, consequently it is only about a third of the Treatise 
which deals with morals in its narrower sense. However, Hume applies moral 
philosophy as a general term for the science of man. In the Advertisement of 
the Treatise, Hume uncovers his plan to complete his work about human na-
ture with the examination of “morals, politics, and criticism.”5 The approach 
to treat moral philosophy as a science which includes, in modern terms, psy-
chology, anthropology, political science and even political economy was 
typical in the mid-18th century.6 In such a framework, moral philosophy for 
Hume is the study of moral beings in general, it is not particularly restricted 
to morality. Discovering the principles of human nature is essential for Hume 
since he treats human science as the hub of all other sciences by declaring it 
to be the “only solid foundation for the other sciences,”7 of which human 
nature is “the capital or centre.”8 No science, including mathematics, natu-
ral philosophy and natural religion, is unconnected to human nature, argues 
Hume, since they all “lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by 
their powers and faculties.”9 Both in human and in natural sciences, the ex-
perimental method denotes the use of experience and cautious observations 
in “different circumstances and situations,”10 the application of “careful and 
exact” experiments in the “endeavour to render all our principles as univer-
4 Hume, Treatise, Intro, 6.
5 See the advertisment that preceeds the Introduction.
6 James A. Harris, Hume. An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015).
7 Hume, Treatise, Intro. 7.
8 Ibid., 6.
9 Ibid., 4.
10 Ibid., 8.
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sal as possible.”11 Hume undertakes to find universal explanatory principles; 
however, avoids going beyond experience by pursuing demonstrative, a priori 
reasoning in his venture. Rather than relying on abstract deductive reasoning, 
Hume intends to discover human nature through collecting experience and 
conducting experiments in the form of attentive observations and reflections 
on them.12 Hume’s non-teleological study of human nature expressly rejects 
uncovering final causes or the end of man through the application of meta-
physical reasoning since they cannot be clearly investigated and supported by 
the experimental approach;13 Hume also asserts that the natural principles of 
human life are not to be observed in man in isolation but moral experiments 
need the reflective observation of “men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, 
and in their pleasures.”14 Since Hume reveals the principles of human nature as 
witnessed in society, his descriptive system of emotions does not depict the 
abstract idea of individuals or of abstract subjects in their singularity either. 
The Treatise sheds light on the principles of the interaction of the affects 
among people in a social context. 
III. The indispensable importance of sympathy in the Humean moral 
framework
Using the experimental method, the three books of the Treatise discuss the 
following three wide-ranging topics: human understanding, the passions, and 
morals. The notion of sympathy has a pivotal role in the last two books, 
where Book II covers matters that nowadays would be termed as the philoso-
phy of psychology.15 Hume describes sympathy as a “very powerful principle 
in human nature,”16 which can change our sentiments and ways of thinking, or 
at least “disturb the easy course”17 of our thought. His treatment of sympa-
thy as the most remarkable quality in human nature expresses admiration of 
our propensity to “receive by communication their [the others’] inclinations 
and sentiments.”18 In the Humean account of human nature, sympathy is the 
mechanism through which we have the ability to “enter so deep into the opin-
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 3.
14 Ibid., 41.
15 H. O. Mounce, Hume’s Naturalism (London: Routledge, 1999).
16 Hume, Treatise, 3.3.1.0.
17 Ibid., 3.3.2.2.
18 Ibid., 2.1.11.2.
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ions and affections of others.”19 Sympathy is clearly not a feeling of sorrow; 
moreover, it is not even a simple fellow-feeling in the Humean framework. 
Pitson defines the term as a mechanism by which “mental states are commu-
nicated from one person to another.”20 Sympathy is a working mechanism, 
a technical term for the way of communicating with the others’ affections, 
emotions, sentiments, inclinations, ways of thinking, and even opinions. 
Hume recognizes the significance of our ability of transmitting affec-
tions by underlining that “the force of sympathy must necessarily be acknowl-
edged.”21 The mechanism of sympathy as a means of communicating one’s 
sentiments is fundamental in the Humean philosophy for several reasons. 
Considering its scope, sympathy is of paramount importance since it works 
as a universal principle affecting all human beings irrespective of age and 
education. Not only children “embrace every opinion proposed to them,”22 
and feel the passions which arise in their fellows through sympathy, but “men 
of the greatest judgement and understanding”23 are also under the effect of 
sympathizing with others’ inclinations and sentiments. Observing man in so-
ciety, Hume finds that no one is immune to the passions which arise in others; 
feelings have a tendency to spread among members of a group through sym-
pathy. Using the medical adjective ‘contagious,’ Hume describes the passions 
as easily transmissible, similar to infections, which “pass with the greatest 
facility from one person to another, and produce correspondent movements 
in all human breasts.”24 The metaphor of contagiousness depicts how pow-
erful the communication of the passions is: the passing of emotions happens 
instantaneously and involuntarily, it does not seem to be possible for anyone 
to stay unaffected by sympathetic feelings. In revealing the principles of hu-
man nature, Hume finds that indifference cannot be attached to the mecha-
nism of the communication of the passions. It is no less than our happiness for 
which sympathetic feelings are crucial. Hume observes that no true content-
ment is conceivable without them. The explanation for this observation relies 
on the social nature of man: Hume stresses how fervently human beings wish 
19 Ibid., 2.1.11.7.
20 Tony Pitson, “Sympathy and Other Selves,” Hume Studies 22, no. 2 (1996): 255.
21 Hume, Treatise, 3.3.6.2.
22 Ibid., 2.1.11.2.
23 Ibid., 2.1.11.2.
24 Hume, Treatise, 3.3.3.5; Waldow distinguishes two forms of sympathy in Hume’s works: 1) 
Sympathy which proceeds by pre-sensation impressions, the pure contagion cases; 2) Sympathy 
which first forms ideas, then converts them into impressions [see Anik Waldow, “Mirroring 
Minds: Hume on Sympathy,” The European Legacy 18, no. 5 (2013): 72]. Vitz on the other 
hand categorizes Humean sympathy along three aspects: 1) a cognitive mechanism; 2) the 
sympathetic sentiment; 3) the sympathetic conversion of an idea into an impression (see Vitz, 
263). 
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to be in society and avoid complete isolation. Our inclination for aspiring 
to social partaking makes perfect solitude “the greatest punishment we can 
suffer.”25 One would feel deeply despondent without the chance to share the 
passions, thus Hume describes even happiness as a miserable state when there 
is no company to share it with. With a paradoxically powerful image, Harris as-
sesses Hume’s description of human nature as intensely social and in passionate 
need of the society of others as an account which is “almost claustrophobically 
social.”26 Besides its animating nature and all-embracing power, the mechanism 
of sympathy is essential in the Humean explanatory schema in the process of 
approbation, too. In his moral experiments, Hume discovers that one would 
not approve of the character of the other if it was not for sympathetic feelings. 
The mechanism of sympathy, the “intercourse of sentiments […] in society and 
conversation,”27 makes us capable of forming the foundation on which we base 
our approval and disapproval of characters and manners. Thus, the sentiment of 
moral approbation rests on the communication of emotions. Hume notes that 
even if “self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice, but 
a sympathy with public interest is the source of moral approbation.”28 In this 
sense, the mechanism of sympathy, which acts as the basis of our moral appro-
bation, is indispensable in the Humean moral framework. Without sympathy 
one is indifferent to the public good on which justice rests. Thus, sympathy is 
the “chief source of moral distinction,”29 and one would become a “monster” 
without its active use.30 Additionally, Hume attributes an even wider range of 
applicability to the importance of the process of forming sympathetic feelings 
by maintaining that it is “the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the arti-
ficial virtues.”31 Besides sympathy producing our sentiment of morals in all arti-
ficial virtues, it “also gives rise to many of the other virtues.”32 In consequence, 
sympathy is utterly influential in the judging of morals. In general terms, sym-
pathy is the basis of sociability, as Hume argues: we have “extensive concern 
for society from sympathy.”33 
25 Hume, Treatise, 2.2.5.15.
26 Harris, 115.
27 Hume, Treatise, 3.3.3.2.
28 Ibid., 3.2.2.24.
29 Ibid., 3.3.6.1. 
30 Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 6.1.
31 Artificial virtues denote human qualities which serve the interest of society and are beneficial 
for the good of mankind; they include virtues such as justice, allegiance, modesty, good-man-
ners; see Hume, Treatise, 3.3.1.9.
32 Hume, Treatise, 3.3.1.10.
33 Ibid., 3.3.1.11.
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IV. The mechanism of sympathy
In order to comprehend Hume’s specific conception of the mechanism of sym-
pathy, the nature of passions and that of ideas need to be clarified. The very 
first sentence of the Treatise elucidates that “all the perceptions of the human 
mind”34 separate into two distinct types: impressions and ideas. Hume ob-
serves that everyone can distinguish the two without hesitation and “readily 
perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking.”35 Although Hume refers 
to feeling and thinking when explaining how laypeople differentiate between 
impressions and ideas, his own science of mind does not separate the two on 
an emotional vs. mental basis. The distinguishing feature in the Humean sys-
tem between impressions and ideas does not even lie in their disparate nature, 
but in their different “degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike 
upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness.”36 By 
maintaining “force and violence”37 to be the most prominent differentiating 
characteristics between impressions and ideas, Hume brings thinking and rea-
soning to passions and emotions as close as possible, leaving no room for a 
clear-cut functional, ontological or epistemological separation between our 
cognitive and emotional perceptions in the consciousness. Thus, regardless of 
the difference in their intensity, all sensations, affections, passions, external 
and internal impressions “are originally on the same footing.”38 Concerning 
force, impressions are substantially more violent than ideas. Hume points out 
that “we cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine-apple, 
without having actually tasted it,”39 and thus he emphasises that “our im-
pressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions.”40 
The principle of the priority of impressions to ideas, or more precisely the 
fact that simple41 impressions are the causes of simple ideas, entails a copy 
34 Ibid., 1.1.1.1.
35 Ibid., italics added by the author.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.,1.4.2.7; some scholars draw attention to the presence of a qualitative difference be-
tween ideas and impressions by arguing that their quantitative difference is a mere first approx-
imation. For further details see John P. Wright, Hume’s Treatise ‘A Treatise of Human Nature.’ 
An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), and Tamás Demeter, David 
Hume and the Culture of Scottish Newtonianism. Methodology and Ideology in Enlightenment 
Inquiry (Boston: Brill, 2016). 
39 Hume, Treatise, 1.1.1.9.
40 Ibid., 1.1.1.8.
41 For Hume, simple perception, as the opposite of complex perception, denotes the notion 
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principle: our ideas are copied images or representations of our impressions.42 
That is, ideas are merely faint images or reflections of our feelings derived 
from sensations. In Hume’s theory of passions, impressions are categorized as 
either of sensation or of reflection. The first type, impressions of sensations, 
the feelings we get from the five senses, such as the perception of pleasure or 
pain, is of no real interest to Hume, as they “arise in the soul originally and 
from unknown causes”43 and “their ultimate cause is perfectly inexplicable by 
human reason.”44 Since determining their ultimate cause is impossible by the 
use of the experimental method, Hume claims the discussion of the impres-
sions of sensations to belong to the topics of anatomists rather than to those 
of moral philosophers. Based on Hume’s observations, an original impression 
of sensation is copied by the mind and becomes a less vivid perception, an 
idea, which does not cease when the sensation itself terminates. The copy 
principle applies further on and the idea of pleasure or pain and produces a 
secondary impression, a “new impression of desire and aversion, hope and 
fear, which may properly be call’d impressions of reflection because deriv’d 
from it.”45 What ordinary language calls passions, desires and emotions are 
these secondary impressions, which “arise mostly from ideas” in a reflective 
manner.46 In Hume’s system of the passions, secondary impressions are fur-
ther copied to become ideas by two faculties of the mind: the memory and 
the imagination. These ideas then can give rise to other impressions (as long 
as they become forceful enough) or to other ideas. Collier warns that the 
distinction between ideas and impressions completely collapses once ideas 
are sufficiently enlivened to become impressions.47 
The Humean principle of sympathy, which converts an individual emotion 
into a social feeling, involves the interplay of violent passions and less vivid 
ideas. The first step in the mechanism is when we perceive others’ affections 
through the effects of their passions, e.g. in their voice and gestures.48 Then, 
these external signs “convey an idea”49 to us, that is, our “mind immediately 
that these impressions and ideas “admit of no distinction nor separation” (see Hume, Treatise, 
1.1.1.2).
42 Hume, Treatise, 1.1.1.11-12.
43 Ibid., 1.1.2.1.
44 Ibid., 1.3.5.2.
45 Ibid., 1.1.2.1.
46 Ibid.
47 Mark Collier, “Hume’s Theory of Moral Imagination,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 27, 
no. 3 (2010): 255-273.
48 Hume, Treatise, 2.1.11; 3.3.1.7.
49 Ibid., 2.1.11.3.
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passes from these effects to their causes.”50 The passions of others appear 
in our mind as ideas, which we first conceive to belong to another person. 
In a short time, however, these ideas appear as if they were completely ours, 
as if they originally sprung in our mind. Finally, the idea of the passion gets 
enlivened and reaches such a degree of vivacity that it is transformed into 
an impression, or in other words, it is “presently converted into the passion 
itself.”51 The ideas are converted into the very impressions they represent and 
“produce an equal emotion as any original affection” in us.52
In the Humean account one cannot directly and instantaneously feel the 
passions of other people. After recognizing the external signs of the other 
person’s sentiments, the first move in Hume’s description of the process of 
forming sympathetic feelings is the passing from these effects to their causes. 
According to Hume’s definition, a cause and effect relation relies on expe-
rience, which “informs us that such particular objects in all past instances 
have been constantly conjoined with each other”53 and “found inseparable.”54 
Based on his observations, Hume stresses that “from the constant conjunc-
tion the objects acquire a union in the imagination.”55 In the account of the 
sympathetic process, Hume clarifies that “no passion of another discovers 
itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its cause and effects. 
From these we infer the passion.”56 That is, sympathy is grounded in infer-
ence rather than in mechanic mirroring. In more general terms, the Humean 
conception of sympathy is primarily a mental, not an emotional principle. 
Waldow also stresses that the Humean sympathetic process starts by forming 
an idea of the other person’s mental state and not by spontaneously sharing 
emotions.57 The importance of the precedence of ideas to emotions in the 
formation of sympathetic feelings is the entailment that feeling others’ emo-
tions requires our ability to conceive an idea of the passion which is sympa-
thetically transmitted. Since passions are causes of behavioural expressions in 
the Humean sense in so far as they are perceived in constant conjunction with 
the behavioural effects, one also needs to possess the ability to link the two 
spheres of emotions (cause) and actions (effect). Furthermore, since others’ 
emotions are imperceptible, the ability of self-observation is also necessary 
50 Ibid., 3.3.1.7.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 2.1.11.
53 Ibid., 1.3.6.7.
54 Ibid., 1.3.6.15.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 3.3.1.7.
57 Waldow, 542; Baier and Waldow, 62.
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for the sympathetic process to commence; without proprioperception, one 
would not be able to infer causal relations between passions and their be-
havioural expressions. The process of transmitting sympathetic feelings pre-
supposes the activity of self-observation with respect to reflecting on one’s 
own emotions, whose range and degree is definitely not mechanic. To initi-
ate the possibility of passing from the behavioural effects to their emotional 
causes, these mental abilities are all required for the commencement of the 
sympathetic process.
The second move in Hume’s account, the transfer of the idea of someone 
else’s passion, the interpersonal step in the sympathetic transmission is possi-
ble on grounds of the principle of resemblance. The perception of ourselves, 
which never fails to be with us, is linked with the other person in the smooth-
est manner through the associative principle of resemblance. Hume notes 
in general that “nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human 
creatures,”58 which law of human nature holds true in particular cases, thus 
“we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree 
or other, we may not find a parallel in ourselves.”59 The minds of all human 
beings are alike with regard to their impressions (or in less technical term, 
their feelings) and also their operational mechanisms.60 Due to these similari-
ties, no one can be “actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in 
some degree, susceptible.”61 It is worth noting that Hume’s principal aim with 
his endeavour in the Treatise is to introduce the experimental method into the 
scientific discovery of human nature, thus he does not embark on emphasizing 
the infinite range of differences in our experiences, which could potentially 
explicate the varying degrees with which we are able to sympathize with the 
diversity of others’ sentiments. Instead, what Hume finds essential is to estab-
lish the general laws of human nature. This is why the Humean claim, which 
would be a radical overstatement in a different context, can assuredly be 
stated: “all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget 
correspondent movement in every human creature.”62 Besides the common 
resemblance of all human beings, Hume also points out that the resemblance 
in character, the similarity of tempers and dispositions additionally facilitate 
the transition of sentiments.63 The principle of universal resemblance among 
human beings creates such a strong association that nothing can have a 
58 Hume, Treatise, 2.1.11.5.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 3.3.1.7.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid. (italics added by the author).
63 Ibid., 2.2.4.6.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 22:17:09 |
[ 41 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1 • 2019
greater effect on our mind than the sentiments of others.64 Hume contrasts 
it with objects or riches such as wine, music or gardens, which cannot excite 
ideas in our minds at the same level of vivacity. The resemblance between the 
other person and ourselves creates a strong tie of association, which inter-
personally transmits the vivacity of the conception initially attributed to the 
other person.65 Hume explains this principle of human nature by a simile taken 
from natural sciences showing the mechanic laws of hydraulics. The vivacity 
of a sympathetic idea is the same as that of the original idea just as the level 
of water in a pipe cannot exceed the volume of water produced at the wa-
terhead: “If I diminish the vivacity of the first conception, I diminish that of 
the related ideas; as pipes can convey no more water than what arises at the 
fountain.”66 The simile depicts the transfer of sentiments among people as if 
the force of the related ideas could flow interpersonally without any obsta-
cles preventing its movement. The simile of the water pipe also reveals that 
the Humean account of the communication of sentiments requires no specific 
channel through which the vivacity of the conception could travel; passions 
simply flood and permeate the perception of human beings. The relation of 
the sheer resemblance of the two individuals renders the association of ideas, 
thus their transfer, possible. The greater resemblance we have with the person 
affected by the original sentiment, the greater vivacity is transmitted to us, 
consequently the more likely it is for our ideas to be enlivened into passions. 
As resemblance moves on a scale, rather than being present or absent in a 
polar manner, the strength of the association depends on the level of simi-
larity, which, however, is not automatically given outside in the world but it 
is identified by the individual mind. Through the activity of reflecting on the 
similarities between the person affected by a passion and myself, the strength 
of the associations can be increased thus the transmitted impression becomes 
more enlivened. 
Besides transferring the recognised degree of vivacity, sympathy also 
conveys the quality of the affection: the same sensation arises in us as in the 
person with whom we sympathize.67 Hume does not explain or justify the rea-
son why the same sympathetic feeling arises in us when we perceive others’ 
affections. However, on this reading, the first step in the Humean account of 
the transmission of emotions, when our mind passes from the external signs 
of others’ passions to their causes, presupposes that the observable effects 
of a passion stem from one single cause. This is to say, a specific gesture or 
64 Ibid., 2.2.5.4.
65 Ibid., 2.1.11.
66 Ibid., 2.2.9.14.
67 Ibid., 2.2.9.9.
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the change of the tone of one’s voice indubitably indicates the emotional 
cause that triggered it. When stating that the same quality of affection aris-
es in the observer as in the person observed, Hume fails to question wheth-
er the same gesture might have originated from various different emotional 
states. Thus Hume rules out the possibility that one can explain others’ ob-
served behaviour with diverse emotional triggers. Such a simplified position 
on the constant conjunction of cause and effect is rather surprising in view of 
Hume’s careful general observation of the fact that a “necessary connection 
depends on the inference, instead of the inference’s depending on the neces-
sary connection.”68 
The source of the last step in the sympathetic mechanism, the turning of 
an idea into an impression, rests on the notion that the idea and impression 
of ourselves are in close intimacy with us at all times, which is an undeniable 
fact for Hume.69 We have an ever-present perception of ourselves: the idea of 
ourselves derives from the consciousness with such a great vivacity that we 
cannot help believing the existence of our own selves.70 The impression of the 
intimate omnipresence of ourselves is crucial in the communication of senti-
ments as the great strength of this persistent impression provides the basis 
of sympathetically feeling the actual passion rather than merely possessing a 
faint idea of it. Mounce pinpoints the fact that, similarly to sympathetic feel-
ings, indirect emotions71 in Hume’s system require a level of thought, which 
involves “the concepts of a language,” since one needs to possess not only 
the impression of oneself, but should be able to focus on the differences be-
tween himself and the other selves in thought.72 Hume seems to remain cryp-
tic in his works about the importance of possessing a language at this phase 
in the process of the formation of sympathetic feelings. It is certain, however, 
that Hume treats the vigorous impression of our own selves as the source of 
infusing the idea of a sentiment with the vivacity needed to convert it into an 
impression of the passion. Due to the great liveliness and vivacity with which 
the perception of ourselves is intimately present to us, the idea of someone 
68 Hume, Treatise, 1.3.6.3.
69 Ibid., 2.1.11.4.
70 Ibid.
71 Based on his observations, Hume classifies the passions as direct and indirect depending on 
source which raises them. Direct passions arise “immediately from good or evil, from pain or 
pleasure,” while indirect ones involve “other qualities” (see Hume, Treatise, 2.1.1.4). Hume’s 
examples for the direct passions include desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and 
security, while pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity are 
named as indirect ones. Indirect emotions are parallel to sympathetic feelings regarding the 
fact that both take an object, the self (see Hume, Treatise, 2.1.2.2), in contrast to impressions 
of sensation, which are “about nothing” (see Mounce, 63).
72 Mounce, 64.
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else’s passion gains additional liveliness and reaches such a high degree of 
vivacity that it is transformed into an impression. In other words, the vivacity 
of the impression of ourselves has the power to invigorate an idea and turn it 
into a passion. In the Humean account of the sympathetic mechanism, the self 
behaves as an amplifier by enlivening the force of an idea to such an extent 
that it becomes an impression. It needs to be noted, however, that the self, 
according to Hume, does not change the quality of the perceptions, whose 
content remains the same.73 
The four steps of the formation of sympathetic feelings clearly reveal 
that in the process of sympathy both passions and ideas operate. Hume em-
phasises that a “mere idea […] wou’d never alone be able to affect us,”74 nor is 
“one relation sufficient to produce”75 the transition of sentiments. These are 
the grounds on which Hume accentuates the intertwined nature of sympathy, 
and stresses that passions in the mechanism arise from the double relation of 
impressions and ideas.76 
For the sympathetic mechanism to work, its object needs to be related 
to us. In the Treatise, Hume observers that our ideas are not “entirely loose 
and unconnected,”77 and the apparent connections between them are not by 
chance; on the contrary, our ideas are related to each other in a systematic 
manner. The systematicity lies in the “associating quality, by which one idea 
naturally introduces another.”78 The facility of transition from one idea to the 
other makes the association appear to be created without effort. Hume notes 
that we are hardly aware of the connecting activity of the mind since the mind 
moves from one impression to a related object with such an ease that it is 
“scarce sensible of it.”79 Based on his empirical observations, Hume catego-
rizes the relations of ideas along three qualities from which associations arise: 
resemblance, causation and contiguity. The principles of association between 
ideas work in the Humean description as original endowments of our human 
73 Adam Smith, Hume’s close friend, puts his account of the transmission of sympathetic feel-
ings on a different footing in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). The self in the Smithian system of sympathetic passions is 
more than a mere amplifier. Smith (see Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1.1.2) argues that with the 
help of the faculty of the imagination we place ourselves in the other’s situation and experi-
ence the impressions of our own senses. Smith warns that it is impossible to gain immediate 
experience of what the others feel as we “can form no idea of the manner in which they are 
affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.”
74 Hume, Treatise, 3.3.2.3.
75 Ibid., 2.2.9.2.
76 Ibid., 2.1.5.5.
77 Ibid., 1.1.4.1.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 1.3.8.2.
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nature, and thus Hume treats them as unexplainable natural principles.80 He 
does not attempt to give an explanation for the reasons why the association 
of ideas works the way he describes it since such a trial would go beyond the 
range of experimental science and consequently it would result in “obscure 
and uncertain speculations.”81 At the same time, Hume acknowledges that it 
is difficult to prove that his classification of the principles of association of 
ideas resulted in a complete and exhaustive list.82 Nevertheless, his observa-
tions lead Hume to conclude that the mechanism of sympathy is one of the 
“many operations of the human mind [which] depend[s] on the connexion or 
association of ideas.”83 Namely, the associative principles are responsible for 
the transmission of particular emotions as “we observe that the affections, 
excited by one object, pass easily to another object connected with it; but 
transfuse themselves with difficulty, or not at all, along different objects, 
which have no manner of connexion together.”84 The first relation in his sys-
tem, the associative principle of resemblance, allows us to enter smoothly 
into the feelings of those who share close similarity with us, e.g. the same 
language, manners, professions etc.85 The second, the principle of cause and 
effect, amplifies the emotions of our family and friends livelier than those of 
strangers86 as “all the relations of blood depend upon cause and effect.”87 
Hume treats the relation of cause and effect to be the most powerful among 
the three, the one which creates the strongest connection between ideas.88 
Further, it is the only relation which goes “beyond the senses,”89 “which can 
lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses,”90 and 
it is the only type of association which connects our present and past expe-
riences, and also our expectations about the future.91 While the principle of 
contiguity, that is of neighbouring objects both in space and time, dramat-
ically influences our affective perception of our own property: “The break-
ing of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a 
80 Ibid., 1.1.4.6.
81 Ibid.
82 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 3.3.
83 Ibid., 3.18.
84 Ibid.
85 Hume, Treatise, 2.1.11.5.
86 Ibid., 2.1.11.6.
87 Ibid., 1.1.4.3.
88 Ibid.,1.1.4.2.
89 Ibid., 1.3.2.3.
90 Ibid., 1.3.6.7.
91 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 4.1.4.
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house, when abroad.”92 Contiguity is responsible for our livelier experiences 
of sympathy “with our acquaintances, than with strangers, with our country-
men than with foreigners.”93 The three principles of association between ideas 
strengthen each other, and when all three relations are combined, we con-
ceive others’ sentiments in the strongest and most lively manner.94 The joint 
presence of the three relations of ideas infuse the others’ passions in our souls 
the most violently and the minds of men become “mirrors to one another”95 
in so far as they reflect each other’s emotions.96 
While the mechanism of sympathy operates as long as the object is relat-
ed to us, its degree, the strength with which we feel another person’s passion, 
depends on the closeness of “relation of the object to our self.”97 If the first 
sensation is small in itself, or if it is not closely related to us, it does not 
have the power to engage our imagination,98 and the mechanism of sympathy 
does not operate. In the Treatise, Hume attempts to introduce principles in 
the science of human nature which are similar to the ones in natural sciences. 
Accordingly, a remote object is observed to induce the sympathetic effect in 
a proportionally weaker manner than an object which is in our vicinity. This 
is a principle similar to what we notice in the perception of external bodies, 
namely, “all objects seem to diminish by their distance.”99 Contrary to this 
effect, if the relation is strengthened between us and the object, the imagina-
tion makes the transition with greater ease and conveys “to the related idea 
the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own 
92 Hume, Treatise, 2.3.7.3.
93 Ibid., 3.3.1.14.
94 Ibid., 2.1.11.5-6.
95 Hume, Treatise, 2.2.6.21; relying on the metaphor of the mirror, Pitson argues that the 
Humean sympathetic model is not a cognitive process (see Pitson, 262). 
96 Rizzolatti et al. found a group of neurons in the brain of primates that “fire when the indi-
vidual sees someone else perform the same act. Because this newly discovered subset of cells 
seemed to directly reflect acts performed by another in the observer’s brain, we named them 
mirror neurons;” see Giacomo Rizzolatti, Leonardo Fogassi, and Gallese Vittorio, “Mirrors in 
the Mind,” Scientific American 295 (2006): 56-61. Similarly, Collier emphasises that social 
neuroscientists have discovered the existence of affective mirror systems in the brain which 
fulfil the function of making us capable of feeling the pain of others; see Collier, op. cit.; also 
Tania Singer, Ben Seymour, John O’ Doherty, Holger Kaube, Raymond J. Dolan, and Chris D. 
Frith, “Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but Not Sensory Components of Pain,” Science 
303 (2004): 1157-1162. Emotional communication is tapped in the brain not only among 
loved ones but among strangers as well. These studies support the mirroring associative hy-
potheses: the same neural circuits fire when we feel pain as when we observe pain in others. 
97 Hume, Treatise, 2.1.11.8.
98 Ibid., 2.2.9.
99 Ibid., 3.3.32.
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person.”100 For this reason, the fortune of people who are close to us can 
never leave us indifferent. Due to the force of sympathy, we enter into their 
sentiments as if they were originally our own: “we rejoice in their pleasures 
and grieve for their sorrows.”101 As our sympathetic engagement depends 
on the proximity in the relation of the object to the self, Waldow raises the 
problem of being too self-preoccupied.102 In the case of an overly concerned 
state with oneself, sympathy is expected to be blocked since the self is unable 
to connect to the object. Waldow calls attention to another problem stem-
ming from the fact that it is the idea of the self which is related to the object 
is one’s belief about oneself.103 Hume does not address this issue; however, 
his account of the nature of the sympathetic process implies the proximity 
of a related object to oneself also depends on what kind of belief one forms 
about oneself. My belief who I am influences how far I place an object on the 
relation continuum. The concept of the self, which is formed by the individual 
person, affects the degree of liveliness of the idea the self naturally transmits 
to the object. That is, how much I am engaged sympathetically is affected 
by the notion how I define myself, which idea is not mechanically produced. 
The experimental method allows Hume to describe how the principle of sym-
pathy works in several diverse situations. The main rules and even the explana-
tions of the seeming or real exceptions to these rules all strongly suggest that the 
sympathetic process operates in a passively mechanical way. In the explication of 
the mechanism of the double relation of impressions and ideas, Hume considers 
the interconnectedness of the imagination and the passions, the role of memory, 
and even the different tempers of people, which all amount to certain universal 
rules of natural causation.104 Hume’s examples tend to suggest that sympathetic 
passions come upon us purely by natural means in a passive manner, without the 
active use of any of our capacities or faculties. Based on these principles, Dar-
wall draws attention to the mechanistic character of the Humean sympathetic 
process.105 Along the same lines, Rick emphasizes the automatic, “starkly mech-
anistic” nature of the Humean description of sympathy, which is evaluated as 
completely void of any reflective process or imaginative projection.106 Boros also 
100 Ibid., 2.1.11.5.
101 Ibid., 2.2.9.20.
102 Baier and Waldow, 69.
103 Ibid., 82.
104 Hume, Treatise, 2.3.6.
105 Stephen Darwall, “Empathy, Sympathy, Care,” Philosophical Studies 89, no. 2 (1998): 261-
282; Stephen Darwall, “Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 28, no. 2 (1999): 139-164.
106 Jon Rick, “Hume and Smith’s Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances,” The Journal of Scot-
tish Philosophy 5, no. 2 (2007): 135-158, 138. 
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declares conclusively that Hume’s mechanism of sympathy is almost analogous 
with the working of the necessary laws of nature due to the similarity in their 
efficiency, which interpretation excludes the possibility of any form of non-me-
chanic alteration in the mechanism.107 Within Hume’s sympathy-based account of 
morality, where moral approbation and the esteem we feel for artificial and other 
virtues is grounded in sympathy, the entirely automatic nature of the formation 
of sympathetic passions would touch upon the problem of one’s responsibility in 
moral matters in an embarrassing way. This is the reason why Alanen raises seri-
ous questions about Hume’s mechanistically understood psychology.108 It is du-
bious for her whether the human mind (more specifically, reason) in the Humean 
associationist framework is capable of contributing anything in the formation of 
judgements or it is a “passive recipient of impressions.”109 In opposition to the 
standard mechanic interpretation of the Humean sympathetic process, Waldow 
emphatically clarifies that the sympathetic mechanism does not directly stimu-
late “unmediated emotions,”110 and calls attention to Hume’s blurring “the line 
between inference-based and experience-caused interpretations of other minds.” 
Vitz also recognizes that “sympathy is a cognitive mechanism” in the Treatise.111 
Despite the fact that ‘the Newton of moral sciences’ undeniably arrives at 
universally working principles, his account of the mechanism of the communica-
tion of the passions is far from being completely mechanic.112 In the following, I 
will identify at which points the otherwise mechanically and passively operating 
process of sympathetic feelings is open to be modified in the Humean framework 
by actively influencing certain skeletal points of the mechanism. 
V. The non-mechanic nature of sympathy
Several examples of the Humean accounts of sympathy show the possibility 
of the active use of our faculties in the modification of the sympathetic pro-
cess. The examples through which I will show the non-mechanic traits in the 
107 Gábor Boros, “On Hume’s Theory of Passions,” The History of Philosophy and Social 
Thought 57 (2012): 17-30.
108 Lilli Alanen, “The Powers and Mechanism of the Passions,” in The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s 
Treatise, ed. Saul Traiger (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 179.
109 For a broader discussion of responsibility in Hume’s moral philosophy see Paul Russell, 
Freedom and Moral Sentiment. Hume’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
110 In Waldow’s terminology a mediated emotion is preceded by thoughts while an unmediated 
emotion spontaneously emerges without the presence of a thought (see Waldow, 541). 
111 Vitz, 263.
112 William Edward Morris, and Charlotte R. Brown, “David Hume,” in The Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2019.
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mechanism include the generation of the sympathetic feelings of a) beauty, 
b) shame, c) anticipated emotions, d) the respect for the rich, and e) the use 
of eloquence. 
i. The sympathetic feeling of beauty
The Humean explanation why we sympathetically feel the beauty of the prop-
erty of another person shows that the principle of sympathy fails to oper-
ate completely mechanically, even if it works systematically. According to 
Hume, we are affected by the beauty of another person’s house because we 
sympathize with the owner, we “enter into his interest by the force of imag-
ination, and feel the same satisfaction, that the objects naturally occasion 
in him.”113 To find an object beautiful, we need to be aware of the fact that 
it has “a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessor,”114 or that it brings 
some advantages to its owner. If the principle of sympathy was totally me-
chanic, the beauty of the appearance of the house on its own could automat-
ically induce sympathetic pleasure. However, the Humean account renders 
the imagination also essential in raising the sympathetic feeling of beauty, 
which is not confined to follow one single direction at all. Our imagination 
is not restricted to turning to the interest of the owner, it might as well take 
an utterly different path. However, without deliberating the advantages the 
beautiful house provides for its owner, we are not affected by the beauty of 
another person’s possession. The pure observation of a beautiful object does 
not spontaneously excite sympathetic emotions; particular thoughts need to 
be considered in our imagination, which is not completely mechanic even in 
the Humean framework. 
The imagination for Hume is a faculty by which we repeat vivid impressions 
in our mind and at the same time transform them into less forceful ideas.115 
Hume applies the term imagination in two different senses, which lends it some 
degree of indistinctness or even ambiguity.116 In the narrower sense, Hume op-
poses the faculty of the imagination to that of reasoning, in which case demon-
strative and probable reasonings are excluded.117 Not referring to the faculty of 
the imagination as a whole, Hume separates a reasoning-based belief formation 
113 Hume, Treatise, 2.2.5.16.
114 Ibid., 3.3.1.8.
115 Ibid., 1.1.3.1.
116 Kenneth R. Merrill, Historical Dictionary of Hume’s Philosophy (Lanham, Maryland: The 
Scarecrow Press, 2008).
117 Hume, Treatise, 1.3.9.19.
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and a sphere outside of it.118 In the broad sense, however, the imagination is 
described as an extremely agile, magical faculty119 in the soul capable of col-
lecting any ideas120 in the blink of an eye irrespective of the topic in question.121 
Hume describes the faculty of the imagination with “a very irregular motion in 
running along its objects,” where the thought “may leap from the heavens to 
the earth, from one end of the creation to the other, without any certain meth-
od or order.”122 Thus, Hume’s explanation of the manner how we form ideas 
that could neither possibly originate from the senses nor from reason resorts 
to the imagination. Considering the nature of the faculty of the imagination, 
Hume distinguishes it from the faculty of memory by claiming that the imag-
ination is responsible for the production of non-mnemonic ideas as it has the 
liberty to “transpose and change its ideas.”123 Along with liberty, the ideas of 
the imagination are “fainter and more obscure”124 than those of the memory. 
Although their difference lies in the different degree of vigour, “an idea of the 
imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass for an idea of 
memory,”125 as long as custom and habit strengthens it. The imagination is not 
constrained by the way the actual world operates, and consequently it has the 
freedom of exploring “the full range of unrealised possibilities.”126 With regard 
to the focus of the imagination, Hume also emphasizes our freedom by claim-
ing that in the imagination I can “fix my attention on any part of it [the universe] 
I please.”127 That is, Hume is convinced that we are endowed to choose which 
ideas to reflect on in the imagination; such a choice is not mechanically deter-
mined in his philosophy of mind. Furthermore, since the strength of a passion 
also depends on the repetition of the idea,128 the active animation of an idea is 
possible through thinking often of it, which is not mechanically automated, but 
depends on the choice of the individual. 
Despite its distinguishing feature of liberty, the faculty of the imagina-
tion cannot be described as completely capricious. The imagination is not 
118 Fabian Dorsch, “Hume on the Imagination,” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of 
Imagination, ed. Amy Kind (New York: Routledge, 2016), 40-54. 
119 Hume, Treatise, 1.1.7.15.
120 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 5.2.
121 Hume, Treatise, 1.1.7.15.
122 Ibid., 1.3.6.13.
123 Ibid., 1.1.3.4.
124 Ibid., 1.3.5.3.
125 Ibid., 1.3.5.6.
126 Dorsch, 42. 
127 Hume, Treatise, 1.3.9.4.
128 Ibid., 2.1.11.7.
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absolutely free from rules, it follows certain systematic principles. Hume 
states that “nothing wou’d be more unaccountable than the operations of 
that faculty, were it not guided by some universal principles, which render 
it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places.”129 One of 
these principles, as Hume describes it in a maritime simile, is the imagination’s 
tendency of not being able to discontinue its line of thinking abruptly: “the 
imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even 
when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries 
on its course without any new impulse.”130 Due to this tendency of extended 
continuation, Biro finds Hume’s concept of the imagination excessively au-
tomatic.131 Additionally, Hume also declares that the imagination follows 
the three associative principles of ideas according to the three species of 
relation (resemblance, causation and contiguity),132 which systematic con-
straint seems to limit the freedom of the faculty of the imagination. Also, 
from the point of view of its generative power, Merrill assesses the freedom 
and creative power of the imagination delusive on grounds that it “operates 
within the narrow limits of the outer and inner senses”133 and cannot cre-
ate its own basic building materials, the impressions and ideas. Furthermore, 
there is regularity in the different levels of strength and vigour with which the 
imagination enlivens particular ideas. The principles of experience and habit 
both “operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more 
intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same 
advantages.”134 The different levels of vivacity of ideas leads Hume to dif-
ferentiate between ideas which are assented to and thus believed, from ideas 
which are completely fictitious and not believed. When explaining belief it-
self, Hume finds himself “at a loss for terms,”135 and stresses that belief “does 
nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive an object, it can only be-
stow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity.”136 From Hume’s position 
that “the belief super-adds nothing to the idea, but changes our manner of 
conceiving it, and renders it more strong and lively,”137 one might conclude 
129 Ibid., 1.1.4.1.
130 Ibid., 1.4.2.2.
131 John Biro, “Hume’s New Science of the Mind,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. 
David Fate Norton, and Jacqueline Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 50.
132 Hume, Treatise, 1.3.6.13; 1.3.9.2.
133 Merrill, 148.
134 Hume, Treatise, 1.4.7.3.
135 Ibid., 1.3.7.7.
136 Ibid., 1.3.7.5.
137 Ibid., 1.3.8.
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that fictitious ideas often repeated in the fancy can become so vivid that 
their strength makes them indistinguishable from the ideas of the memory; 
that is, ideas of the fancy will be believed as real rather than fictitious. Hume 
expresses clear opposition to this assumption by warning that the too lively 
activity of the imagination generates madness: people who give their assent 
to vivid ideas of the fancy without the support of experience lack sanity.138 
With regard to force and vivacity, it needs to be remarked that an idea of 
the imagination that is not believed, one that is not enlivened enough by 
habit and custom, is most probably not forceful enough to bring the process 
of sympathy to completion either.139 Hume’s position on the importance of 
belief in the generation of passions is not the least tentative; he declares that 
“belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions.”140 Pitson 
also emphasises that “the absence of belief will normally prevent an idea”141 
from being transformed into the impression it represents. The natural force of 
the belief is what ensures that passing ideas of the fancy to which no assent is 
given do not raise sympathetic feelings in the sane person. 
Although the faculty of the imagination follows systematic regularities 
which definitely impose certain limitations, it is far from being mechanical-
ly constrained. First of all, it needs to be mentioned that one of the three 
relations, the principle of resemblance, “hardly counts as a mechanic princi-
ple.”142 Demeter also considers resemblance to be a non-mechanic relation, 
one which “implies the active contribution of the mind.”143 In general, he 
emphasizes how the principles of association are dissimilar from Newtonian 
gravity as they have no uniform effects on all ideas but depend on the ideas’ 
particular properties, especially on their representational content. To go even 
further, the imagination enjoys complete freedom in some sense. The vast 
variety of the modifications in the connections of ideas is unlimited since 
the imagination can change the position of ideas “as it pleases.”144 Hume 
explicates how natural it is for the imagination to be unbounded to take any 
particular path by arguing that “all our ideas are copy’d from our impressions, 
and that there are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable.”145 
It takes little challenge for Hume to explain why there is such a diversity in the 
138 Ibid., 1.3.10.9.
139 Ibid., 2.3.6.7.
140 Ibid., 1.3.10.4.
141 Pitson, 262.
142 Alanen, 184.
143 Demeter, 162.
144 Hume, Treatise, 1.3.5.3.
145 Ibid., 1.1.3.4.
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connections of ideas through the activity of the imagination by pointing out 
that it is natural for this faculty to move ideas apart and exchange them.146 
Once a compound idea is separated, the imagination is free to create new 
connections among them, “we may mingle, and unite, and separate, and con-
found and vary our ideas in a hundred different ways,”147 the imagination “can 
join, and mix, and vary them [ideas] in all the ways possible.”148 Owing to this 
capacity of the imagination, we can consider even contrary propositions in 
matters of fact with equal ease, as “the imagination is free to conceive both 
sides of the question.”149 To conclude, the imagination has the propensity to 
enjoy liberty in its creative power, even if there are certain systematic tenden-
cies it typically follows. 
With this in mind, let us now return to the emergence of the sym-
pathetic feeling of beauty. Since a particular idea, the one that the ob-
ject produces pleasure or advantages to its owner, is indispensable in the 
generation of this sympathetic feeling, its transmission is not the least 
mechanically carried out. The sympathetic feeling of beauty is excited 
only if the creative power of the imagination, which is able to form a wide 
array of possible connections of ideas instead of running on one single, 
mechanically determined track, connects this very idea with the beautiful 
object. 
Besides applying the power of the imagination, Hume’s account of the 
sympathetic pleasure derived from the beauty of another person’s proper-
ty includes another prerequisite. His argument for the reason why we feel 
a sympathetic pleasure when seeing someone else’s beautiful house asserts 
that the sense of beauty is intimately connected to utility. The proposition 
is supported by the example of the image of two hillsides, one of which is 
covered in beautifully blossoming furze and broom, while the other in vines 
and olive-trees.150 To the person who is not familiar with the value of each, 
both hillsides in bloom might appear equally beautiful. Yet, he who knows the 
value of wine and that of olive oil cannot feel the mere flowery bushes to be 
as beautiful as the lavish vines and olive-trees. Accordingly, he cannot admire 
the owner of a hillside covered in furze and broom as much as the owner of 
vine and olive-trees. Apparently, the mechanism of sympathy is not automatic 
at this point: what appears to the senses does not simply initiate the process 
of sympathizing. One needs to be well-acquainted with the worth and utility 
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., 1.3.7.7.
149 Ibid., 1.3.7.3.
150 Ibid., 2.2.5.18.
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of the otherwise beautiful object in order to appraise its real value. Without 
the appropriate knowledge of assessment, the sense of beauty is not excit-
ed to its full potential. To generate the sympathetic feeling of beauty, one 
needs to gain proper knowledge about the object, or ample experience about 
the object’s relevant constant conjunctions. Besides knowledge or familiarity 
with the object, the assistance of the imagination is also needed at this point 
in the process of sympathy, since it is the imagination which attaches particu-
lar thoughts to the sensually perceived beauties of the object. Hume declares 
that the foundation of beauty is in the imagination, not in the senses.151 In 
case one knew about the practical value and utility of a beautiful object, but 
failed to connect it with the impression produced by the senses, the feeling of 
sympathetic pleasure would not be excited with great intensity and the sym-
pathetic process would not unfold. On these grounds, sympathetic feelings 
of beauty cannot be regarded as completely mechanic either.
ii. The sympathetic feeling of shame
The mechanic nature of the process of sympathy is also dubious in the case 
of those sympathetic emotions which are the transitions of non-existing af-
fections. Hume claims it to be possible that “we blush for the conduct of 
those, who behave themselves foolishly before us; and that tho’ they shew no 
sense of shame, nor seem in the least conscious of their folly.”152 The exam-
ple of the sympathetic feeling of shame clearly demonstrates that, contrary 
to Hume’s universal principles drawn on observations,153 not all sympathetic 
feelings are the exact copies of an original emotion. Even if the person ob-
served feels no shame, the mechanism of sympathy can excite shame in us, an 
emotion which has clearly no equivalent in the other person. Due to the ac-
tivity of the imagination, the process of sympathy can produce a completely 
different emotion in us. That is, the imagination is more than a mere amplifier 
for Hume: it is the faculty which makes the generation of the sympathetic 
feeling possible, which is otherwise not present in the other person. In the 
case of transmitting originally non-existing feelings, e.g. that of shame, the 
mechanism of sympathy is not limited to passive automatisms. Similarly, to 
the pervious example of exciting the sympathetic feeling of beauty, the active 
use of the imagination plays an important part in the communication of the 
passions in this example too, which is obviously non-mechanic. Waldow also 
points out that “Humean sympathy unfolds even in cases where other people 
151 Ibid.
152 Hume, Treatise, 2.2.7.
153 Ibid., 2.2.9.9.
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lack the relevant emotion.”154 It is worth mentioning that not all observers 
would blush in the same situation as the path along which our imagination 
runs is not determined mechanically. This is why Demeter emphasizes that 
sympathy is “active in selecting the relevant ideas”155 to be transformed into 
corresponding impressions. 
iii. The sympathetic feeling of anticipated emotions
The time-extension aspect of the process of sympathy also reveals how far 
this principle is from being completely automatic. Hume declares that sympa-
thetic feelings can be raised not only in relation to the present, but with re-
gard to the future as well. “It is certain that sympathy is not always limited to 
the present moment, but that we often feel by communication the pains and 
pleasure of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by 
the force of imagination.”156 The use of the imagination forms no obstacle in 
imbuing our ideas with such a vivacity that they become violent impressions; 
that is, the mechanism of sympathy runs to its completion even if the affec-
tion of the other person is not yet present. The time gap does not alienate 
us from feeling a sympathetic emotion, “considering the future possible or 
probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a con-
ception as to make it our own concern.”157 Again, the principle of sympathy is 
effective as long as our imagination deliberates about the possible outcomes 
of a situation in the other person’s life. That is, sympathetic feelings with a 
future reference cannot be excited without carrying out reflections in the 
imagination, thus completely mechanic means do not raise them.
iv. The sympathetic feeling of respect for the rich
Our sympathetic feeling of respect for the rich arises in a less than sponta-
neous manner, too. Giving esteem to the rich is not a mechanic infusion of 
emotions; in order for it to take place we need to turn our attention to cer-
tain thoughts, according to Hume. The principle of sympathy communicates 
the admiration of the rich if “we consider him [the rich] as a person capable 
of contributing to the happiness or enjoyment of his fellow-creatures, whose 
sentiments, with regard to him, we naturally embrace.”158 In this case, the 
154 Waldow, 543. 
155 Demeter, 153.
156 Hume, Treatise, 2.2.9.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid., 3.3.5.
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communication of the sympathetic passions depends on our imagination. The 
idea of another’s feeling is transformed into the corresponding feeling in us 
as long as our imagination turns to the capacity of the rich to enhance the 
pleasures of the people around him. Without this specific thought, the mecha-
nism of sympathy does not work to its fullest capacity. The sheer sight of the 
wealth of the rich cannot mechanically excite sympathetic feelings in us; our 
deliberation is indispensable in the process. 
All the accounts of the above Humean examples of the generation of sym-
pathetic feelings show that the sympathetic process is not completely mechanic 
as it greatly depends on the activity of the imagination, on deliberation and on 
the association of ideas. In favour of a mechanistic reading of Hume’s account 
of the sympathetic process, one might argue that the activity of the mind in 
connecting ideas works mechanically in the Humean system. To a first approxi-
mation, the statement holds true as the association of ideas appears to be me-
chanic for various reasons. The mechanistic nature of the associative principles 
might be explained by the fact that the transition of ideas from an impression 
to a related object seems to proceed without effort,159 and also because it hap-
pens in such a quick manner that the imagination “interposes not a moment’s 
delay.”160 Yet, the association of ideas is not without reflective mental activity. 
Hume claims it is custom which “renders us, in a great measure insensible” of 
the fact that “we accompany our ideas with a kind of reflection.”161 In less 
technical terms, the association of ideas is so much well-practiced that we do 
not even recognize its working. That is, reflection is not completely excluded 
from the Humean system of the transmission of the passions: it is merely not 
emphasized in the explication of the process, but kept in the background since 
we tend to connect ideas on a customary basis. Additionally, the association 
of ideas gives the appearance of working mechanically since one can easily read 
Hume’s associative principles as if they were of the same nature as the laws of 
physics. Indeed, Hume sets out in the Treatise to introduce the scientific exper-
imental method into the exploration of human nature. Yet, there is a crucial 
difference between the nature of his three principles of association of ideas 
and that of Newton’s three laws of motion. For example, the acceleration of a 
body of a given mass can be precisely predicted if the vector sum of the forces 
on the body is known by applying Newton’s second law. Hume’s explanatory 
principles, however, cannot anticipate the outcome of our associations. It is 
impossible to foresee which relation of the three will be associated in a given 
159 Ibid., 1.3.8.2.
160 Ibid., 1.3.6.14.
161 Hume, Treatise, 1.1.7.18; Pitson notices that though custom may operate independently 
of reflection, “Hume points out that in the case of more unusual associations reflection may 
assist custom;” see Pitson, 266.
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situation, and even the very principles themselves can result in a multitude of 
different associations of ideas. Hume’s associative principles explain the con-
nections of ideas one has already made, but they cannot predict which ideas 
in the imagination are going to be connected next. The connection of the im-
pressions would be foreseeable if the human mind was operating completely 
mechanically. However, experience and habit, reflection and deliberation all 
change the course of the connection of ideas and prevent it from running on a 
mechanically determined path. 
v. Sympathetic feelings excited by eloquence
Finally, in the account of the process of communicating sympathetic feelings, 
Hume argues that the art of verbal representation has the power to modify our 
sympathetic engagement. Even if the initiation of the mechanism of sympathy 
can be described as automatic to some extent, in some cases our ideas of oth-
er’s passions are not violent enough to turn immediately into vivid impression, 
and thus we are left sympathetically unaffected. However, in such cases the 
process of sympathy can be brought to a culmination by the persuasive power 
of words. Hume points out that “nothing is more capable of infusing any pas-
sion into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are represented in their 
strongest and most lively colours. We may of ourselves acknowledge, that 
such an object is valuable, and such another is odious; but ‘till an orator excites 
the imagination, and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble in-
fluence either on the will or the affections.”162 That is, the degree of liveliness 
of our ideas does not always allow for a spontaneous communication of the 
passions on its own without the presence of some aid external to the mecha-
nism. If sympathy was a mere passive automatism, the relation of impressions 
and ideas might fail to take place; however, sympathetic communication can 
be brought to a completion by an eloquent speaker actively amplifying the 
vivacity of our ideas. In Hume’s account, eloquence is as powerful in animating 
ideas and creating emotional involvement as close proximity of the object: 
“Virtue, placed at such a distance [old history], is like a fixed star, which, though 
to the eye of reason, it may appear as luminous as the sun in his meridian, is so 
infinitely removed, as to affect the senses, neither with light nor heat. Bring this 
virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the person, or even by an 
eloquent recital of the case; our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy 
enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest sentiments of 
friendship and regard.”163 
162 Hume, Treatise, 2.3.6.7.
163 Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 5.43.
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The use of eloquence in actively generating sympathetic feelings differs 
from the previous examples. All the other examples demonstrate that the 
person whose sympathetic feelings are excited can himself amplify or even 
generate the sympathetic process through the active use of the faculty of the 
imagination, through self-observation, deliberation or reflection and through 
gaining knowledge about the object of sympathy. The account of the impor-
tance of the appropriate verbal phrasing in generating sympathetic feelings, 
however, illustrates that the person observed or a third party can also be 
responsible for the non-mechanic alteration of the sympathetic process. Thus, 
the Humean sympathy is an interpersonal mechanism which can be modified 
by the participants involved and even by an observer narrating the emotional 
transfer. 
VI. Conclusion
The aim of the present paper, to further our understanding of the operation of 
the sharing of emotions in human life, was carried out by fathoming Hume’s 
schema of the communication of the passions. In Hume’s works, it is the 
sympathetic mechanism through which we are capable of partaking in the 
emotional life of others: the principle of sympathy enables us to participate 
in others’ pleasures and pains. The operation of sympathy as a principle of 
communication among human beings allows us to share ways of thinking and 
sentiments, and to be directly moved by the passions of others. With regard 
to the way how emotions are mediated and transformed, Hume’s ostensibly 
mechanic and automatic model of the communication of the passions can 
definitely be characterized as systematically aiming at universal principles; 
however, the mechanistic model does not exhaust Hume’s account of sympa-
thy. The Humean examples of the process of sharing our feelings show clear 
signs of the lack of a completely self-regulatory mechanism. The Humean 
framework allows for a touch of a quality of voluntariness. Summing up the 
implications of the above Humean examples of transmitting feelings, it is 
grounded to claim that the communication of the passions through the sym-
pathetic mechanism is capable to be modified. The alterations can be initiated 
by the person who receives the sympathetic feelings and also by the person 
whose passions are transmitted, or even by a third party narrating the original 
affections. In the first case it is the activity of the imagination; one’s power 
of deliberation and reflection; the choice of the focus of one’s attention; 
one’s concept about one’s self; the range and degree of self-observation; and 
also one’s knowledge, experience and familiarity with the object which can 
change the formation of sympathetic feelings; while in the second case the 
sympathetic process is free to be changed by the eloquent use of words. That 
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is, even in a seemingly mechanic model, there is room for altering or at least 
amplifying one’s sympathetic feelings. When sympathizing with others’ affec-
tions we are not mere passive recipients, our “passions arise in conformity to 
the images we form of them.”164 
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